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T
he recent U.S. financial crisis—characterized by
financial institution failures, heightened fear of
counterparty risk, and worldwide coordinated cen-
tral bank intervention to reduce financial market stress—
is widely regard to have ended by March 2009. Since its
end, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has
focused on policy to accelerate the recovery of economic
activity. Promi  nent among the FOMC’s policies has been
the “Large Scale Asset Purchase” program (LSAP), a quan-
titative easing (QE) policy designed to reduce long-term
market interest rates. The program called for the Federal
Reserve to purchase $300 billion of long-term Treasury
securities, approximately $175 billion of federal agency debt,
and up to $1.25 trillion of agency-guaranteed mortgage-
backed securities, concluding in March 2010.1 The recent
slowing in the pace of economic recovery has raised dis-
cussion of the need for a second LSAP-style program.
Most analysts have concluded that the LSAP success-
fully reduced long-term market interest rates. Two recent
studies, for example, suggest that the LSAP reduced yields
on 10-year Treasury securities by as much as 100 basis
points below levels that otherwise would have prevailed.
In addition, the program appears to have reduced interest
rates abroad.2,3
How, exactly, do LSAP-style programs succeed? Two
elements are necessary: Long-term market rates must
decrease and aggregate spending must respond. Consider
the first: Asset purchases are asserted to affect market rates
by a “portfolio balance” effect. A typical analysis begins
with the public holding two assets that differ only in time
to maturity. Holders of the long-maturity asset risk a
decrease in the asset’s price if/when market interest rates
increase. When the Fed purchases such assets from the
public, the extent of this interest rate risk is reduced and,
perhaps, market interest rates will decrease by the size of
the now-smaller risk premium. Formal models of this
effect, however, usually require an ad hoc market friction.
In a recent analysis, Hamilton and Wu consider an experi-
ment in which a central bank sells its holdings of short-
term Treasury securities and purchases an equal amount
of long-term Treasuries.4 In their model, short-term yields
rise and long-term yields fall. This result, however, requires
at least two distinct groups of investors, each of which
strongly prefers either short- or long-term assets even after
allowing for differences in yields. Further, in the real world,
the Fed’s actions differ somewhat from those in the model:
Since March 2009, the Fed has paid for purchased assets
by creating new deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks,
not by the sale of existing short-term assets. Only banks
and a few other financial institutions are permitted to hold
deposits at the Fed, while Treasury securities are widely
held.
Second, aggregate demand must respond to lower
long-term interest rates—a sustained economic rebound
requires recovery in household spending and business
investment.5 This aspect is more uncertain. Recent surveys
suggest that business investment spending is tepid due to
uncertainty regarding future demand, not high long-term
interest rates—indeed, large businesses are borrowing read-
ily in credit markets at highly favorable terms. Lending to
households and small businesses remains constrained by
increased lender caution about risk tied to uncertainty
regarding future demand, sales, and income. Neither sector
is hampered by excessively high long-term interest rates. ■
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